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Torts
by Deron R. Hicks*
I.

PREMISES LIABILITY

In Music v. Steamco, Inc.,' the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a restaurant in a slip
and fall action.2 The action was filed by a patron of the restaurant who
suffered injuries when she fell down a set of stairs while exiting the
restaurant. Plaintiff, after having lunch with her friends at defendant's
restaurant, prepared to leave the restaurant by way of the same stairs
she used to enter the restaurant. As she stood at the top of the stairs,
plaintiff noticed water on the steps; however, the steps had been dry
when plaintiff entered the restaurant. Notwithstanding the presence of
the water, plaintiff began to descend the steps, slipped, and fell. During
the course of discovery, plaintiff admitted that although it would have
been inconvenient, she could have avoided the wet steps altogether.? In
affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant, the court of appeals focused on the issue of whether plaintiff
had knowledge of the hazardous condition, despite the exercise of
ordinary care. 4

In Robinson v. Kroger Co.,' the Georgia Supreme Court held that to
recover for injuries sustained in a slip and fall, a plaintiff must satisfy

* Partner in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C. Adjunct
Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. University of Georgia
(B.F.A., 1990); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., cum laude, 1993).
Mercer Law Review, Senior Managing Editor 1992-1993. Co-Author, GEORGIA LAW OF
ToRTs: PREPARATION FOR TRIAL (1996). Member, State Bar of Georgia and American Bar
Association.
1. 265 Ga. App. 185, 593 S.E.2d 370 (2004).
2. Id. at 186, 593 S.E.2d at 371.
3. Id. at 185, 593 S.E.2d at 371.
4. Id. at 186, 593 S.E.2d at 371.
5. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997).
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a two-prong test.6 First, the plaintiff must prove that the owner or
occupier of the premises had actual or constructive knowledge of the
hazard.7 Second, the plaintiff must prove lack of knowledge of the
hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care.8 According to the court of
appeals, "standing water in plain view on the steps was one which 'any
person with ordinary, common sense would recognize as something that
might cause a person to trip, slip, or fall."' 9 The court of appeals,
therefore, held that plaintiff had equal knowledge of the hazard and
failed to exercise due care for her own safety.'0
Standing alone, the decision in Music is of little significance. The
decision, however, should be contrasted with Mac InternationalSavannah Hotel, Inc. v. Hallman," a decision issued by the court of
appeals one month later.'2 In Hallman the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's denial of summary judgment for a hotel in a slip and fall
action.' 3 In Hallman, plaintiff was a member of a tour group visiting
Savannah. After a bus tour of the city, plaintiff checked into her room
at defendant's hotel and shortly thereafter left the hotel for dinner.
Upon returning to the hotel, plaintiff attempted to enter the hotel
through a different door, which was located up a short flight of stairs
and across a landing. A sign was posted on the door; however, in order
to read the sign, plaintiff had to climb the steps and cross the landing.
The steps and landing were both dark and the handrails for the steps
were overgrown with bushes. 4 Notwithstanding the obvious hazards,
plaintiff walked up the stairs to read the sign, which read "Exit only.
Do not Enter." 5 Plaintiff then began to descend the stairs when she
fell and broke her ankle. According to an expert retained by plaintiff,
the stairs constituted a trip hazard for several reasons, to include the
fact that the height of the stair risers varied beyond what was acceptable under the standard building code. Defendant's motion for summary
16
judgment was denied by the trial court, and defendant appealed.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 749, 493 S.E.2d at 414.
Id.
Music, 265 Ga. App. at 186, 593 S.E.2d at 371.
Id.
Id.
265 Ga. App. 727, 595 S.E.2d 577 (2004).
Id. at 727, 595 S.E.2d at 577.
Id., 595 S.E.2d at 578.
Id.
Id
Id. at 727-28, 595 S.E.2d at 578-79.
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On appeal the court of appeals again recited the two-part burden of
proof that a plaintiff must satisfy in a slip and fall case. 17 Based on
the facts, the court concluded that plaintiff presented evidence that
defendant knew or should have known of the hazardous condition of the
steps because defendant swept the steps daily and pressure washed the
steps quarterly.'8 The court, therefore, held that plaintiff satisfied the
first prong of the Robinson test.' 9 As to the second prong of the
Robinson test, defendant's argument on appeal was essentially two-fold.
First, defendant argued that plaintiff assumed the risk of her fall
because she voluntarily entered a darkened area to use stairs that were
poorly lit.20 The court of appeals, however, held that defendant was
responsible for plaintiff entering the dark area because it failed to
property illuminate the doorway and it failed to post a sign that could
be read from the sidewalk. 2' Second, defendant argued that it was not
liable for plaintiff's injuries because plaintiff had equal knowledge of the
stairway's condition.2 2 According to the court of appeals, there was
nothing in the evidence to establish that plaintiff knew the stairs were
a trip hazard.' Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.24
Judge Andrews, in a dissenting opinion, stated that there were certain
facts that the majority ignored in reaching its decision.25 One of the
facts noted by Judge Andrews was that plaintiff had entered and exited
the hotel at the main entrance and, therefore, knew where she was able
to enter the hotel. 2' Although Judge Andrews never explicitly states
so in his opinion, it is clear he questioned the need for plaintiff to enter
the darkened area at all. As in Music, plaintiff was not required to
traverse the dangerous condition and could have avoided it altogether.
Moreover, Judge Andrews pointed to the testimony of plaintiff, who
previously stated she believed the cause of her fall was the area was not
well lit.27 Accordingly, Judge Andrews stated that notwithstanding any
testimony on the unevenness of the steps or the inadequacy of the
handrail, there was no evidence that these conditions had actually

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 728, 595 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 728-29, 595 S.E.2d at 579.
Id.
Id. at 729, 595 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 729-30, 595 S.E.2d at 579-80.
I& at 730, 595 S.E.2d at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 730-31, 595 S.E.2d at 580 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
Id. at 731, 595 S.E.2d at 580 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
Id. at 732, 595 S.E.2d at 581 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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resulted in plaintiff's fall.28 Moreover, to the extent that the cause of

the fall was the lack of lighting in the area, Judge Andrews noted that
plaintiff had clear knowledge that the area was poorly lit.29 As Judge
Andrews noted, plaintiff "knew that the lighting was 'dark and shadowy,'
but nonetheless chose that doorway to enter, rather than returning to
the main entrance from which [she] exited." 0
As inMusic, plaintiff in Hallman had a known, safe, and alternative
means of traversing the area where the slip and fall occurred. Plaintiff
in Hallman was not required to ascend the steps and cross the landing
to enter the hotel. Likewise, plaintiff in Music was not required to
traverse the wet area on the steps to leave the restaurant. In fact, a
much stronger argument could be made that plaintiff in Music was
presented with fewer options on how she could exit defendant's
restaurant. What is clear, however, is that the plaintiffs in both Music
and Hallman voluntarily elected to take their respective paths.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals in Music held that plaintiff voluntarily
entered a known and dangerous condition; therefore, plaintiff had equal
knowledge of the condition."' In contrast, the court of appeals in
Hallman determined that plaintiff, who attempted to traverse a
hazardous condition of her own volition, lacked equal knowledge of the
alleged hazard.'
As the court in Music noted, "'any person with
ordinary, common sense would [have] recognize[d] [the standing water]
as something that might cause a person to trip, slip, or fall.'"' It is
unclear, however, why similar ordinary, common sense was not required
in Hallman.
II.

ANIMAL LIABILITY

In the movie The Pink Panther Strikes Again, 4 Inspector Clouseau,
played by Peter Sellers, engages in the following conversation with an
innkeeper:
Inspector Clouseau: "Does yer dewg bite?"

28. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting). It is clear that Judge Andrews is concerned that these
alleged static defects were relied upon by the trial court and the majority in denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment, even in the absence of any evidence that such
defects were causally connected to plaintiff's fall.
29. Id. at 733, 595 S.E.2d at 582 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Andrews, J., dissenting).
31. Music, 265 Ga. App. at 186, 593 S.E.2d at 371.
32. Hallman, 265 Ga. App. at 729, 595 S.E.2d at 579.
33. Music, 265 Ga. App. at 186, 593 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Means v. Marshalls of MA,
243 Ga. App. 419, 421, 532 S.E.2d 740, 741 (2000)).
34.

THE PINK PANTHER STRIKES AGAIN (Anjo Productions 1976).
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Innkeeper: "No."
Inspector Clouseau: "Nice doggie" (Clouseau then bends down to pet
the dog, which proceeds to bite him) "I thought you said yer dewg did
not bite!"
Innkeeper: "Zat... iz not my dog."'
This famous scene from Peter Sellers's classic film brings to mind the
incident described in the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Osowski
v. Smith.36 In Osowski plaintiff was a cable TV installer who scheduled
an appointment with defendants to install cable television at their
residence. When plaintiff arrived at defendants' residence, he saw
several dogs roaming around the residence and asked one of the
defendants if the dogs would bite him. Defendant assured plaintiff that
he would restrain the dogs. Thereafter, defendant left the immediate
area; plaintiff, no longer seeing any dogs, left his vehicle and entered the
residence. As plaintiff started to leave defendants' residence, he was
struck from behind by a dog. Plaintiff claimed that he was injured as
a result of being knocked to the ground by the dog. Defendants disputed
most of plaintiffs testimony, although they agreed that there were dogs
on the property. One of the defendants recalled that there were three
dogs on the property that day, two of which were owned by defendants.
Similar to Inspector Clouseau's situation, the third dog, which defendants believe knocked plaintiff to the ground, allegedly did not belong
to defendants.3 7
During the course of the civil action, the parties agreed to stipulate to
the following facts: plaintiff was an invitee on the property; there was
no leash law in effect; and defendants did not have superior knowledge
of the dangerous propensity or temperament of the dog that allegedly
knocked plaintiff to the ground. Based on these stipulations of fact, and
finding neither evidence that plaintiff specifically asked that the
offending animal be put inside the house nor evidence that defendants
had offered to do so, the trial court entered summary judgment for
defendants.3" The court of appeals reversed.39
The court of appeals first noted that in a typical dog bite case, "a
plaintiff must produce evidence of the vicious propensity of the dog in
order to show that the owner of the premises had superior knowledge of
In this case, plaintiff conceded that there was no
the danger."40

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
262 Ga. App. 538, 586 S.E.2d 71 (2003).
Id. at 538-39, 586 S.E.2d at 72-73.
Id. at 539, 586 S.E.2d at 73.
Id.
Id. at 540, 586 S.E.2d at 73.

420

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

evidence that the animal at issue had dangerous propensities or that
defendants knew about any such propensities.4 ' Nevertheless, the
court of appeals noted that "a person may be held liable for the negligent
performance of a voluntary undertaking."42 In this respect, the court
of appeals held that "[wihen one undertakes an act that he has no duty
to perform and another person reasonably relies upon that undertaking,
the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable care.
The person assuming such responsibility may be held liable for
negligently performing the duties so assumed."' Viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded that a question
of fact existed on whether defendants had undertaken a duty to ensure
that the dogs would not pose a risk to plaintiff." Specifically, the court
noted that there was evidence in the record that plaintiff had discussed
the issue of restraining the dogs with one defendant."' Although
defendants argued that they had only offered to restrain one dog, the
court of appeals held that the conflict in testimony created an issue of
fact for the jury."
III. DEFAMATION
Several interesting cases in the area of defamation were issued by the
Georgia appellate courts during the survey period. In Gast v. Brittain, 7 the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in a defamation action." In Gast defendant was
an eagle scout youth leader in a Boy Scout troop for which plaintiff was
an adult leader. Defendant, having apparently become disillusioned
with the troop's leadership, submitted a letter of resignation, a copy of
which was sent to certain people involved with the troop and the parents
of the Boy Scouts.4 9 The letter set forth the reasons for defendant's
resignation, which included, in part, his allegation that plaintiff was
"'immoral' and did not live his life according to the 'ideals of [scouting.," 0 The letter also contained specific allegations of child abuse and

other acts of improper conduct against another troup leader who was not

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id (citations omitted).
Id. at 540-41, 586 S.E.2d at 74.
Id. at 540, 586 S.E.2d at 74.
Id. at 540-41, 586 S.E.2d at 74.
277 Ga. 340, 589 S.E.2d 63 (2003).
Id. at 340, 589 S.E.2d at 63.
Id.
Id., 589 S.E.2d at 64.
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specifically identified. After the letter circulated, plaintiff brought suit
against defendant for libel. 5
On motion for summary judgment before the trial court, defendant
argued that the statements in the letter, which concerned plaintiff, were
only "expressions of non-actionable opinion." 2 The trial court agreed
and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. 3 The court of
appeals, however, reversed and held that a question of fact existed as to
whether the opinions implied "defamatory facts about [plaintiff] that
The supreme court granted
were capable of being proved false.'
certiorari and reversed.55
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court first noted that
matters of opinion, to which reasonable persons may differ, are not
considered libelous. 6 That is, "[an assertion that cannot be proved
false cannot be held libelous." 7 Accordingly, defendant's assertions
concerning his opinion that plaintiff was "immoral" and did not abide by
the "'ideals of [sicouting'" were "plainly the sorts of opinions that are
incapable of being proved false."" Nonetheless, the supreme court
recognized that "[an opinion can constitute actionable defamation if the
opinion can reasonably be interpreted, according to the context of the
entire writing in which the opinion appears, to state or imply defamatory
facts about the plaintiff that are capable of being proved false."59 The
question faced by the court was whether the allegations regarding the
other troop leader, although not directed against plaintiff, could
reasonably be interpreted to imply defamatory facts about the plaintiff.' The supreme court held that the letter clearly separated the
allegations against the other troop leader from the allegations against
plaintiff.61 Therefore, as the allegations of child abuse could not
reasonably be interpreted to apply to plaintiff, the supreme court held
that the letter did not constitute actionable defamation.62

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 341, 589 S.E.2d at 64.
57. Id. (quoting Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, 176 Ga. App. 745, 747, 337 S.E.2d 770,
772 (1985)).
58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 342, 589 S.E.2d at 64.
62. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 64-65.
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In McCandliss v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.,3 the Georgia Court of
Appeals extended the single publication rule in defamation cases to
include Internet postings." McCandliss was the founder of Hipsters,
a social club for "persons of size. . .. " The first social gathering held
by Hipsters included a lingerie show with plus-size models. Plaintiff,
acting under a pseudonym, submitted photographs of one of the plus-size
models along with an article about Hipsters to an adult magazine
The photographs of the model
entitled "Plumpers and Big Women."
were submitted without the model's consent."7 "The model thereafter
sued both McCandliss and the magazine for the unauthorized publication of her pictures. . .. '
70
69
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution ("AJC") covered the lawsuit.
The headline for one of the articles in the newspaper read: "The Hipster
party in metro Atlanta was noted on the cover [of 'Plumpers and Big
Women']: '5,000 Pounds of Sex-Starved Fatties.'7 1 After publication,
the article was placed in an archive located on the newspaper's Internet
website. Approximately two years after the publication of the initial
article, McCandliss filed suit against the AJC. The basis of the lawsuit
was McCandliss's contention that the newspaper inappropriately
attributed the caption from the cover of the magazine to his organization.72 According to the complaint, the "AJC libeled [McCandliss and]
placed him in a false light in the public eye."7 3 The AJC, relying on
section 9-3-33 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A."), v4
subsequently "filed a motion to dismiss [the complaint] arguing that it
was barred by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to claims of
defamation."75 The trial court dismissed the suit on that basis and
McCandliss appealed.7 6 The court of appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.77

63. 265 Ga. App. 377, 593 S.E.2d 856 (2004).
64. Id. at 378, 593 S.E.2d at 858.
65. Id. at 377, 593 S.E.2d at 377.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Tim Galloway, Model and Lawyer Stand up to Club Racy Magazine, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Sept. 7, 2000, at JG1.
70. McCandliss, 265 Ga. App. at 377-78, 593 S.E.2d at 857.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 378, 593 S.E.2d at 857.
73. Id.
74. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982).

75. McCandliss, 265 Ga. App. at 378, 593 S.E.2d at 857.
76. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 857-58.
77. Id. at 380, 593 S.E.2d at 859.
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On appeal McCandliss argued that the single publication rule7"
should not apply to the Internet posting made by the AJC.79 "Under
the single publication rule, 'one publication is only one libel, regardless
.,,o
of the times it was exposed to the view of different people .
According to the court of appeals,
"[t]he purpose of the single publication rule is to protect newspaper
defendants and the courts from a multiplicity of suits and an almost
endless tolling of the statute of limitations. Its goals can be accomplished by requiring a plaintiff to collect all of his damages in one
action, and establish that the statute of limitations is to run from the
date of initial publication.""
McCandliss, however, argued that insofar as a website can be altered at
any time by its publisher, each separate "hit" on the website should be
considered a new publication that renews the statute of limitations.8 2
The court of appeals rejected that argument."8 Instead, the court of
appeals noted that the policies underlying the single publication rule
took on even greater significance in light of the mass communication
provided by the Internet.' According to the court of appeals, "'[t]hose
policies are even more cogent when considered in connection with the
exponential growth of the instantaneous, worldwide ability to communicate through the Internet.'" 5 Based on the extension of the single filing
rule to Internet publications, the court of appeals determined that
McCandliss's defamation claim was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations."6
In Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
the corporate promoter of the 1997 Miss Nude World International
Pageant could not be held liable for slander because there was no
evidence that the promoter had expressly directed or authorized an
employee to make allegedly slanderous statements about plaintiff, nor

78. Rives v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 220 Ga. 485, 487, 139 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1964).
79. McCandliss, 265 Ga. App. at 378, 593 S.E.2d at 858.
80. Id. (quoting Cox Enters. v. Gilreath, 142 Ga. App. 297, 298, 235 S.E.2d 633, 634
(1997)).
81. Id. (quoting Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth. v. Cox Enters., 243 Ga. 760, 760, 256
S.E.2d 443, 444 (1979)).
82. Id. at 379, 593 S.E.2d at 858 (citing Firth v. State of New York, 775 N.E.2d 463
(N.Y. 2002)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Firth, 775 N.E.2d at 463).
86. Id. at 380, 593 S.E.2d at 859.
87. 266 Ga. App. 515, 597 S.E.2d 571 (2004).
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had it published the statements about plaintiff.88 In Galardiplaintiff
was a contestant in the 1997 Miss Nude World International Pageant.
The pageant was operated by the corporate owner of the Pink Pony, an
adult entertainment club. During the course of the six-day pageant, an
employee of the corporate promoter accused plaintiff of certain "ballot
improprieties." Plaintiff was also accused of stating that she had
"bought" the contest. Plaintiff denied the allegations; nevertheless, she
was barred from participating in the remainder of the pageant. Plaintiff
alleged that, as a result of the action taken by the corporate promoter,
her reputation was badly damaged and her career as an adult entertainer was derailed. 9
Plaintiff brought suit against the corporate promoter and alleged, inter
alia, that the corporate promoter had slandered her. A jury returned a
verdict on the slander claim in the amount of $500,000 against the
The court of
corporate promoter and two individual defendants.
appeals reversed the jury's verdict.91
In reversing the jury's decision, the court of appeals outlined the
circumstances in which a corporation may be held liable for the alleged
slanderous statements of an agent or employee.' The court of appeals
first noted that
[a] corporation is not liable for the slanderous utterances of an agent
acting within the scope of his employment, unless it affirmatively
appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized to slander
the plaintiff. For liability to attach, the corporation must expressly
order and direct the agent to say those very words.93
The only evidence plaintiff offered that showed the corporate defendant
had expressly directed or authorized the slander was that the corporate
entity had a sole shareholder, who also served as the sole director,
president, and chief executive officer of the corporation. According to
plaintiff, the employee who allegedly made the slanderous statements
acted as the owner's "personal representative." Therefore, plaintiff
argued that the corporation should be responsible for the statements
The court of appeals rejected this argumade by that employee.'
ment.95 The court noted that there was no evidence that the corporate

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 515, 597 S.E.2d at 573.
Id. at 515, 517, 597 S.E.2d at 573-74.
Id. at 515, 597 S.E.2d at 573.
Id.
Id. at 517, 597 S.E.2d at 574.
Id.
Id. at 518, 597 S.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 518-19, 597 S.E.2d at 575.
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entity had actually directed the employee to make the alleged slanderous
statements. 96 Moreover, the court of appeals held that "the doctrine of
"
respondent [sic] superior does not apply in slander cases.
IV.

GEORGIA TORT CLAIMS ACT

The Georgia Tort Claims Act 9s (the "Act") provides a limited waiver
of sovereign immunity for actions against the State of Georgia for torts
committed by state officers or employees acting within the scope of their
official duties. 9 Because the Act operates as a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity, it has been strictly construed by Georgia
courts. 0 0 The Act, however, does not operate as a complete waiver of
sovereign immunity for torts committed by agents or employees of the
state. Rather, the Act sets forth certain specific exceptions to the waiver
of sovereign immunity.'0 ' For example, the Act provides that the
"state shall have no liability for losses resulting from ... [a]ssault...
[and] battery .... ,102 As made clear in Oconee Community Service
Board v. Holsey,'° the application of this exception to the waiver of
sovereign immunity is not limited to those situations in which the
person committing the assault and battery is a.state employee."," The
lawsuit in Holsey was filed after plaintiff's daughter-a resident of a
community home for persons with developmental disabilities-was
stabbed and killed by a house-mate. Plaintiff claimed that the state
agency had negligently placed the house-mate in the community home
without proper treatment or supervision. Defendant moved to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint on the ground of sovereign immunity. The trial
The court of appeals recourt denied the motion to dismiss.'05
versed.' °
Plaintiff's daughter, who was blind, mentally retarded, and suffered
from cerebral palsy, was under the care and treatment of the Oconee

96. Id. at 518, 597 S.E.2d at 575.
97. Id.
98. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2002).
99. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23.
100. See Bd. of Regents v. Riddle, 229 Ga. App. 15, 493 S.E.2d 208 (1997) ("Although
the State has waived its sovereign immunity for negligent acts, the waiver is 'only to the
extent and in the manner provided' by the Act."); Dep't of Human Res. v. Hutchinson, 217
Ga. App. 70, 71, 456 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1995).
101. See O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24.
102. Id. § 50-21-24(7).
103. 266 Ga. App. 385, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004).
104. Id. at 386, 597 S.E.2d at 491.
105. Id. at 385, 597 S.E.2d at 490.
106. Id.
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Community Service Board (the "Board"). While in the care and
treatment of the Board, plaintiff's daughter was placed in a community
home. Mary Ann Williams was also residing in the same community
home. On February 11, 1999, Williams was admitted to a hospital after
she attacked a caseworker at the community house. Williams was
released from the hospital five days later and again placed in the
community home. Two days after her return, Williams stabbed
plaintiff's daughter to death. 107
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals first determined that the
Board was a state department or agency for purposes of sovereign
immunity."l ' The court of appeals looked to the provisions of the
Georgia Tort Claims Act and O.C.G.A. section 50-21-24(7).'09 to
determine whether the state had waived its sovereign immunity with
respect to plaintiff's claim." As set forth above, O.C.G.A. section 5021-24(7) provides that the state shall have no liability for losses
resulting from assault or battery."' However, according to plaintiff,
the exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in section 5021-24(7) should only apply when the assault and battery is committed
by an agent of the State of Georgia, not a third party." 2 The court of
appeals, however, rejected this argument." s According to the court of
appeals: "'[In determining whether the exception... applies,... the

focus is not on the government action taken or the duty allegedly
breached by the government, but on the act causing the underlying loss,
and it is not necessary that such act have been committed by a state
officer or employee.'"" 4 Therefore, the focus is on whether the "'loss
"results" from such assault and battery, even though there may have
been other contributing factors.'"" 5 Accordingly, because plaintiff's
daughter's "death resulted from the stabbing, which constitutes an
assault or battery within the meaning of [O.C.G.A. section] 50-21-24(7),
sovereign immunity shields [the Board] from liability.""'

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7).
110. Holsey, 266 Ga. App. at 386, 597 S.E.2d at 491.
111. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-24(7).
112. Holsey, 266 Ga. App. at 386, 597 S.E.2d at 491.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Dep't of Human Res. v. Coley, 247 Ga. App. 392, 394, 544 S.E.2d 165,
168 (2000)).
115. Id. (quoting Coley, 247 Ga. App. at 397, 544 S.E.2d at 165).
116. See also Ga. Military Coll. v. Santamorena, 237 Ga. App. 58,514 S.E.2d 82 (1999);
Bd. of Regents v. Riddle, 229 Ga. App. 15, 493 S.E.2d 208 (1997) ("the exception covers all
'losses' that result from an assault or battery, regardless of the identity of the actor
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NEGLIGENCE

In McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP v. Keller,"7 the Georgia Court
of Appeals addressed the question of "whether a party to a legal dispute
"
may bring an action against an adversary's attorney for negligence. ""
Plaintiff was a former vice-president of First Atlanta Securities, LLC
("First Atlanta"). When plaintiff began working for First Atlanta he
signed an employment agreement, which contained certain noncompetiThe
tion, nonsolicitation, and proprietary information covenants.
agreement also specifically provided that First Atlanta could disclose
these covenants to any of plaintiff's future employers. Subsequently,
plaintiff entered into employment negotiations with a competitor of First
Atlanta. A letter was sent from First Atlanta to the president of
plaintiff's prospective employer, which included a copy of the employThereafter, Long,
ment agreement that referenced the covenants.
Aldridge & Norman, LLP (now McKenna, Long & Aldridge), counsel for
First Atlanta, sent a similar letter to plaintiff's prospective employer.
The letter from Long, Aldridge & Norman indicated that certain
documents, computer disks, and other items were missing and were
assumed to be in the possession of either plaintiff or another former
The letter also specifically stated that plaintiff was in
employee.
9
Plaintiff
of
his
employment agreement with First Atlanta.'1
violation
that
the firm
and
alleged
&
Norman
Aldridge
against
Long,
suit
brought
had negligently failed "to investigate adequately its client's allegations
20
The trial court
against [plaintiff] before sending the demand letter."

committing the assault or battery"); Christensen v. State, 219 Ga. App. 10, 13, 464 S.E.2d
14, 17 (1995); Dep't of Human Res. v. Hutchinson, 217 Ga. App. 70, 456 S.E.2d 642 (1995).
In Department of Human Resources v. Hutchinson, the court of appeals held that the
Georgia Department of Human Resources ("Department") could not be held liable for an
assault by a juvenile under the Department's custody. 217 Ga. App. 70, 73, 456 S.E.2d
643, 645 (1995). In Hutchinson a juvenile with a criminal history was placed by the
Department in a foster home operated by plaintiff. After placement in the foster home, the
juvenile found a gun owned by plaintiff and shot plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the Department
under the Act based on a theory that the Department had been negligently indifferent to
plaintiffs safety by placing the juvenile in plaintiffs custody without sufficient warning of
the juvenile's alleged violent propensity. The trial court denied the Department's motion
for summary judgment. Id. at 71, 456 S.E.2d at 643. The court of appeals reversed. Id.
at 73,456 S.E.2d at 645. The court of appeals held that because plaintiffs claim "resulted
from" an assault, liability was precluded. Id. at 72, 456 S.E.2d at 644.
117. 267 Ga. App. 171, 598 S.E.2d 892 (2004).
118. Id. at 171, 598 S.E.2d at 893.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 174, 598 S.E.2d at 895.
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denied Long, Aldridge & Norman's motion for summary judgment. 2'
The court of appeals reversed.'22
The court first noted that "[i]t is well established that an action in
negligence requires the breach of a duty owed to the claimant. The four
elements to any tort action are a duty, a breach of that duty, causation
In this regard, the court of appeals noted that
and damages. ' "'
several Georgia cases have discussed "the element of duty in the context
of attorneys' relationships with noncients."'2 4 Of particular importance to the court of appeals was the decision in Tarver v. Wills,"2' in
which the court of appeals held that a cause of action in negligence was
not appropriate because
the overriding public policy guarding free access to the courts and the
fact that the attorney's legal duty is to his own client, [demanded a
finding] that the attorney owed no legal duty to [an adverse party] to
investigate fully the client's claim prior to filing suit... or to avoid

filing a suit which he knew or should have known was frivolous."2 6

Therefore, the court of appeals held that "if an attorney owes no legal
duty sounding in negligence to an adversary to investigate a client's
claim prior to filing suit or to avoid filing a potentially frivolous suit,...
certainly the attorney owed no duty to investigate before merely sending
a demand letter on behalf of a client."" 7 Accordingly, as plaintiff's
claims arose from Long, Aldridge & Norman's alleged failure to
adequately investigate its client's allegations, defendant owed no legal
duty to plaintiff giving rise to a claim of negligence. 2 '
In Brown v. All-Tech Investment Group, Inc., 2A the Georgia Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to two
day trading firms." ° In Brown survivors of a shooting spree at two
day trading firms and the families of seven individuals killed in the
shooting spree brought an action for damages resulting from the
incident."' According to the court of appeals:

121. Id. at 172, 598 S.E.2d at 893.
122. Id. at 174, 598 S.E.2d at 895.
123. Id. at 172, 598 S.E.2d at 894 (quoting Traina Enters. v. RaceTrac Petroleum, 241
Ga. App. 18, 18, 525 S.E.2d 712, 713 (1999)).
124. Id. See Karpowicz v. Hyles, 247 Ga. App. 292, 543 S.E.2d 51 (2000).
125. 174 Ga. App. 550, 330 S.E.2d 896 (1985).
126. Id. at 551, 330 S.E.2d at 898 (citations omitted).
127. McKenna, 267 Ga. App. at 173-74, 598 S.E.2d at 894-95 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 174, 598 S.E.2d at 895.
129. 265 Ga. App. 889, 595 S.E.2d 517 (2004).
130. Id. at 900, 595 S.E.2d at 526.
131. Id. at 889-90, 595 S.E.2d at 519.
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Day trading is a form of financial securities trading in which traders
place multiple buy and sell orders for securities and hold the positions
for a very short period of time, usually less than one day, seeking profit
from the daily fluctuations in stock prices. In exchange for commission
on each trade [defendants], as day trading firms, provided their
customers access to computer terminals and specialized computer
software used in day trading .... Day trading is highly speculative.
A large majority of day traders fail to profit from their trading....
Each [day trading firm] had policies to monitor their customers' success
and to reevaluate the suitability of customers whose accounts lost a
certain percentage in a certain period of time.'32
Mark 0. Barton began trading at All-Tech Investment Group, Inc., a
day trading firm, in April 1998. At the time he opened his account,
Barton made certain representations regarding his net worth. The day
trading firm, however, never verified Barton's net worth. In little over
a year of trading, Barton lost over $400,000. At that point, All-Tech
closed Barton's account. Within a few days, Barton went across the
street to Momentum Securities, Inc., another day trading firm, and
opened an account. Again, Barton misrepresented his net worth. The
second day trading firm also failed to verify his financial information.
In little over13 a month, Barton lost over $100,000 at the second day
trading firm.

On the day of the shooting, Barton contacted the managers at both
day trading firms and informed them he would be bringing in checks to
reactivate his accounts. Barton then entered each day trading firm and
began randomly firing at people working on the trading floor. Barton
killed nine people and injured twelve.' 34
Plaintiffs brought suit against the two trading firms alleging that the
trading firms had "violated their duty to determine the suitability of
Mark Barton to day trade, that Mark Barton risked and lost substantial
amounts of money which were not risk capital, that [the trading firms]
facilitated Barton's losses through predatory practices, and that
workplace violence is prevalent and recognized. " 3" The trial court
granted the motion for summary judgment filed by both day trading
firms.'36 The court of appeals affirmed.' 37

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 890-91, 595 S.E.2d at 519-20.
Id. at 892, 595 S.E.2d at 520-21.
Id. at 892-93, 595 S.E.2d at 521.
Id. at 895, 595 S.E.2d at 522.

136. Id. at 890, 595 S.E.2d at 519.
137. Id.
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On appeal plaintiffs conceded that Barton's shooting spree constituted
an intervening criminal act by a third party, between the trading firms'
alleged negligent conduct and plaintiffs' injuries."
As noted by the
court of appeals, under Georgia law, an intervening criminal act of a
third party is deemed the proximate cause of the injury, breaking the
causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury,
unless three conditions are met. 9 Those three conditions are as
follows: (1) the intervening criminal act of a third party was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's conduct; (2) the act was
triggered by the defendant's conduct; and (3) the act was sufficient of
itself to cause the plaintiff's injury. 4°
On appeal plaintiffs argued that although Barton's actions constituted
an intervening criminal act, Barton's actions were merely an "intervening consequence" of the trading firms' business practices, rather than an
"intervening cause" of plaintiff's injuries.' 4 ' In this respect, plaintiffs
alleged that it was "'common knowledge that some people will become
violent and seek revenge against a party they hold responsible for their
financial losses.'" 4 2 In support of this contention, plaintiffs presented
evidence of certain experts who "discussed generalized concepts of violent
reactions to financial disaster and workplace violence."" o However,
the court of appeals reviewed the experts' testimony and conluded that
[elven assuming the.., events happened as described [by the experts]
and the trading firms knew or should have known about them, the
experts' testimony illustrates vividly that even arguably similar acts of
violence were so unusual, contrary to ordinary experience, and rare
that no reasonable jury could find the trading firms should have
guarded against them.'"
The court noted in a footnote to its opinion that it "[was] undisputed
that before Barton pulled out his weapons, 'no employee [of the day
trading firms] had any reason to believe Barton in particular could be
dangerous. ' ""4 5 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the issue
of proximate cause was "so plain, palpable and indisputable as to
demand summary judgment for the defendants.""

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 893, 595 S.E.2d at 521.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 894, 595 S.E.2d at 522.
Id. at 895, 595 S.E.2d at 522.
Id., 595 S.E.2d at 523.
Id. at 895-96, 595 S.E.2d at 523.
Id. at 896, 595 S.E.2d at 523.
Id.
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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Ever since the Georgia Supreme Court decision in Lee v. State
Farm,147 a question has existed on whether Georgia has been drifting
towards a more liberal application of the "impact rule"14 in cases of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Shores v. Modern Transportation Services, Inc. , the Georgia Court of Appeals hinted as to the
direction the appellate courts may be leaning. 5 ° In Shores plaintiff
was the operator of a train's lead locomotive. The locomotive, operated
by plaintiff, collided with a tractor-trailer owned by defendant and
operated by defendant's employee. Plaintiff was not injured in the
accident; however, plaintiff alleged that he subsequently developed posttraumatic stress syndrome and suffered from panic attacks. Plaintiff
brought suit against defendant on the basis of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed. 5 ' The court of appeals
affirmed. 2
The court of appeals recited two well-established circumstances in
which a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be
stated: First, those circumstances in which the plaintiff has suffered
emotional distress as a result of an impact to the plaintiff's person,
resulting in physical injury; second, those situations in which the
plaintiff suffers injury to property, resulting in pecuniary loss from
mental injury.15 The court noted that plaintiff failed to prove either
set of circumstances."M Nonetheless, plaintiff argued that the court of
appeals should "'relax' the impact rule to permit a negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim where the plaintiff shows presence in the zone
of danger."'5 5 The court of appeals noted that the Georgia Supreme
Court "eased the impact rule" in the decision in Lee when it permitted
"a mother to pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
where, although not injured herself, she nonetheless observed injury to
her child resulting in the child's death." 56 The court of appeals,
147. 272 Ga. 583, 533 S.E.2d 82 (2000).
148. Id. at 584, 533 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Ryckeley v. Callaway, 261 Ga. 828, 829, 412
S.E.2d 826, 827 (1992)).
149. 262 Ga. App. 293, 585 S.E.2d 664 (2003).
150. Id. at 296, 585 S.E.2d at 666.
151. Id. at 293-94, 585 S.E.2d at 664-65.
152. Id. at 293, 585 S.E.2d at 665.
153. Id. at 295, 585 S.E.2d at 665.
154. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 665-66.
155. Id. at 296, 585 S.E.2d at 666.
156. Id.
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however, declined to relax the impact rule to encompass the facts of the
case before it. 57 Significantly, the court stated that "[i]t follows that
even were we so inclined (andwe are not), the adoption of a rule broader
than that approved in Lee is beyond our authority."5 ' Accordingly,
although the court notes that a decision to extend the ruling in Lee is
beyond their authority, the court of appeals also makes it abundantly
clear that such an extension is disfavored.' 59

157. Id.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id.

